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Advocate General in Wightman says in 
his Opinion that Article 50 Notification 
can be Unilaterally Revoked 
By Dr Ewan Kirk, Centre for Brexit Studies 
The opinion of Advocate General Campos Sánchez-Bordona provides 
some useful insight into the issue of revocability of the Article 50 
notification made by the UK Government in March 2017. This is the 
first indication of the possible outcome in this case, ahead of the Court 
of Justice judgment due next week on this issue. The AG Opinion is 
not binding, however, and the Court is free to disagree with the 
opinion and the reasoning of the AG. Therefore, although it provides 
some helpful guidance, it is worth considering that this is an opinion 
arrived at independently of the judges in the Court and is non-binding. 
Nevertheless, it may be influential upon the decision of the Court as it 
will be considered by the judges prior to the issuing of their judgment. 
There are a number of issues dealt with by the AG in his Opinion: 
1. The admissibility of the case (raised by the UK Government who 
claimed that the question was theoretical and therefore 
inadmissible) 
2. The compatibility of unilateral revocation with international law, 
in particular the Vienna Convention 
3. The issue of unilateral revocability as a matter of national 
sovereignty 
4. Conditions or restrictions upon the ability of a Member State to 
revoke Article 50 notification once it has been issued. 
Admissibility issue 
The main argument of the UK Government was that in their opinion, 
the matter before the CJEU was inadmissible due to it being a 
theoretical issue, and not one that was the subject of a genuine 
dispute before a court of an EU Member State. The AG dismissed this 
argument rather succinctly. There were several points of note in his 
approach here. 
Firstly, a lot of emphasis was placed upon the referring court’s 
decision to refer the case – if it had considered it inadmissible, then it 
would, in his view, not have referred it in the first place. Arguments 
were put in the Scottish Court of Session and in a subsequent appeal 
by the UK Government regarding the inadmissibility of this issue for 
an Article 267 reference to the CJEU, and they had been 
unsuccessful. 
In addition to this, the AG identified that there was in fact a genuine 
dispute between the applicants and the UK Government regarding the 
question of revocability, and the question referred was central to that 
dispute. The UK Government had argued that the matter was purely 
academic, as the UK Government had no intention of revoking the 
Article 50 notification. However, the AG argued that the question had 
relevance because this concerned an ongoing process, as the Article 
50 process had been activated and would still be active until March 
2019 under the current arrangements. He also argued that the 
practical “legal, economic social and political repercussions”[1] of the 
ongoing process prevented the question from being considered to be 
merely theoretical. It would also have the effect of informing the UK 
Parliament of an available option. Several of the applicants were 
members of parliaments who would be responsible for voting upon the 
Withdrawal Agreement[2], it would allow them to take an initiative to 
move towards that option within their respective parliaments. 
The fact that the withdrawal of the UK from the EU had not yet taken 
place was not relevant here, as an ex ante resolution to this issue was 
relevant in this situation. This is mainly because once the UK’s 
withdrawal from the EU has taken place (at the very least by operation 
of law on the 29th of March 2019), this question becomes academic 
because revocation would definitely be impossible at that stage. 
Compatibility with Vienna Convention 
The AG dealt with the compatibility of this issue in international law. I 
will leave it to scholars of international law with more expertise than 
me to dissect the reasoning here, but in summary the AG identified 
the relevance of Article 68 of the Vienna Convention which identifies 
that a notification of withdrawal from a treaty may be revoked at any 
time up to the point that it comes into effect. The AG identified that 
this was the point at which the Withdrawal Agreement had been 
properly ratified. Therefore revocation could take place before all the 
procedures for ratification had taken place, including the vote in the 
UK Parliament and the European Parliament, as required by Article 50 
itself. The manifestation of State Sovereignty in being able to 
withdraw from international treaties was also manifest in its ability to 
revoke that notification up to the point that it came into effect. 
Revocation of “intention” and not “decision” 
Probably the most compelling argument as to why the UK retained the 
ability to change its mind and revoke the Article 50 notification came 
in the section of the AG’s Opinion on the interpretation of Article 50 
itself. Article 50 provides for a Member State to notify the EU Council 
of its intention to withdraw from the European union, and not 
it’s decision to do so. A statement of future intention is exactly that, 
and cannot be argued to bind the statement maker into that course of 
action if they subsequently change their minds. He analogises the 
situation to one where, had the UK’s notification not been “in line with 
constitutional requirements”, then such notification would have been 
unilaterally revoked through not having the appropriate foundation to 
satisfy the requirements of Article 50. 
Conditions Attached 
Although all the above appears at first glance very encouraging for the 
applicants in that it  supports the revocability of the Article 50 
notification by the UK, the unilateral nature of the revocability was, 
according to the AG, subject to conditions. 
The AG has pitched an interesting compromise that appears to be an 
attempt to steer between the two opposite positions on this matter. On 
the one hand, there were concerns in the submissions from the EU 
Council and the Commission to the Court regarding the potential for 
abuse of the Article 50 process. They were that any Member State 
might be able to use the Article 50 process and the threat of 
withdrawal as a negotiation tool to achieve other ends, or abusively to 
extract concessions from the other EU Member States through its use 
as an economic threat. They argued that it was essential to require 
the unanimous agreement of the EU Council for a revocation to be 
effective. There is also the opposite possibility of one of the remaining 
Member States using unanimity as a way of extracting unrelated 
concessions from the Member State attempting to revoke, effectively 
being able to use a veto on the attempted revocation. His Opinion sits 
between these two possibilities, and confirms that he considers that 
the Member State should be able to revoke unilaterally, but subject to 
certain conditions. They would more accurately be described as 
‘safeguards’, as they operate to avoid the possibility of a Member 
State (either the withdrawing State or a remaining State) acting 
abusively with regard to the Article 50 process. 
Firstly, a requirement of revocation would be that it must occur by 
formal act to EU Council. In the case of the UK, it is reasonable to 
assume that this would be by letter from the Prime Minister, in the 
same way that notification of intention to withdraw was by this 
method. The likelihood would be that, in line with 
the Miller judgment,[3] an Act of Parliament authorising the Prime 
Minister to do so would be required. 
This is in line with another of the conditions, that a Member State 
could only revoke their Article 50 notification if it was “in accordance 
with its own constitutional requirements”, which mirrors the 
requirements of Article 50(1) TEU for notification. The AG commented 
that this would require an Act of Parliament in the UK’s case. 
Thirdly, the revocation must be within the time limit set out in Article 
50 (2 years), and therefore there is a time constraint that in the case 
of the UK, is close to running out. Presumably the right to revoke 
would also extend in the event of the Article 50 period being extended 
beyond the 2 years as per Article 50(3). This also underlines the 
importance of the need for the revocability question to be 
answered ex ante, as it is clear from this that any challenge regarding 
revocation would be legally ineffective after the time limit has expired. 
In addition to this, another time limit has been referenced in the AG’s 
Opinion. He has indicated that any revocation would also be 
ineffective if it occurs after the process for ratification of the 
Withdrawal Agreement has been completed. This would suggest that 
once the UK Parliament has passed an Act of Parliament ratifying the 
Withdrawal Agreement and the European Parliament has voted in 
favour of the agreement, that it is no longer open to the Member State 
to revoke. This raises additional questions, because although we are 
fairly close to the deadline for the UK, it was always possible that the 
Withdrawal Agreement is concluded before the expiry of two years, 
and possibly could have been agreed much before then. However, 
this is in line with the requirements of the Vienna Convention, which 
states that withdrawal from a treaty shall only be revocable up until it 
takes effect. 
Finally, the AG also mentioned the requirement of ‘good faith’. This 
addresses the Commission and Council’s concerns regarding the 
abuse of the Article 50 process. Any Member State found not to be 
acting in good faith through, for example, evidence of the Member 
State trying to manipulate the Article 50 process for ulterior purposes, 
would find that their attempted revocation would not be valid. The AG 
argued that this would, through the use of the appropriate legal 
instruments, be an effective safeguard against abuse of the Article 50 
process, along with the requirements that the process must be in line 
with the Member State’s own constitutional requirements, and 
therefore unanimous agreement of the EU Council would be 
unnecessary. These would be an effective safeguard against the 
actions of, for example, a Head of Government attempting to act in a 
tactically abusive way with regard to the use of the withdrawal 
notification. 
The Opinion of the AG demonstrates an attempt to navigate through 
an issue upon which Article 50 itself is silent, whilst at the same time 
dealing with the concerns regarding its abuse. If this is followed by the 
CJEU in its judgment, then it will show a compromise between the two 
extremes and allow MS to unilaterally revoke, while maintaining 
safeguards. Most importantly, it places an additional option on the 
table for MPs deciding upon whether to ratify the UK Government’s 
negotiated Withdrawal Agreement. It seems that in these times of 
such political uncertainty, legal certainty provides the UK Parliament 
the opportunity to act in what it sees as the best interests of the UK. 
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